NATO Facts
North Atlantic Treaty Orgaisation |
Created 1949 in Washington |
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30 members |
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2% of GDP |
NATO MAIN TASK
NATO Strategic concept |
1. NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. We are a defensive Alliance. |
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Authoritarian actors not directly called a threat |
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China "challanges interests, security and values" |
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NATO not a threat to Russia, does not seek confrontation |
NATO Core Tasks (continued) |
Deterrence and defence - Increasing readiness, New Maritime domain |
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Crisis prevention and Management |
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Collective security |
NATO as a PARTNER
NATO and EU |
Critical partnership, NATO by itself will not work |
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EU economic cooperation pushes security cooperation, collective responses |
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Ukraine-Russia. Through NATO deterrence, EU sanctions |
NATO and China
US and China |
US interest = european interest |
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Technology challenges |
China threat to values |
Authoritarian, ideological (freedom, human rights, democracy) |
NATO's New Task from Lecture
New tasks are old ones |
Deterrence and Russia |
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Old fashion deterrence with new dimensions - internet, gas |
Threats |
Russia's weaponisation of energy |
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Lots of non-military and non-traditional |
Issues |
NATO has military tools, but not economic (Needs EU) |
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Democracy may not be enough for inclusion. Conflicts between member states (Greece-Turkey) |
NATO Article 4 and 5 |
Now Cyberattack included (Estonia 2007) |
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Article 4 says that security issues are first discussed, then Article 5 can be implemented |
Article 3 |
You can free ride, you can ask for assistance |
Article 10 |
Open-door policy provided you can defend yourself and you are a democracy |
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Evolution of Russian Threat to NATO
Why is Russia a challange? |
Russia's economy is stagnant, no longer a great power |
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Kremlin can push through challanges |
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Cyber attacks, limited military intervention, and operations |
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Russian military still relevant |
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Kremlin ambitions for sphere of influence |
Why are Russian tactics effective? |
Credibility and backing of conventional forces |
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Now arguably half-credible seeing Russian military failure |
NATO Technology
Technology and new Threats |
Cyber, Space |
NATO's future |
Must increase Cyber preparations as well |
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Future question of whether a cyber-attack would qualify for article 5? |
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Technology can allow smoother functioning for example air-land |
NATO's Enduring Relevance
US leadership in NATO |
Russian revisionism gets new engagement from the US, though politics are not always stable. |
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Now not ideological conflict |
NATO's new aims |
Building up deterrence and defence |
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Probably not conventional warfare |
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Russia Hybrid Warfare |
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Stronger regionalisation |
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Question of whether just being a democracy is enough to be a member |
Permanent Deterrence / US military in Europe
NATO Deterrence |
Broadening region, for example now more emphasis on bordering countries |
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Reinforce NATO cohesion |
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Increased air and naval deployments in region |
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Promote training and readiness to US (reinforce confidence) |
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Ensure maximum US forces flexibility for a quick response (training in Northern Norway) |
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Expand opportunities for burden-sharing |
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Ensure adequate host-nation support for NATO |
NATO and expansion |
1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act |
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Finland, Sweden - NATO Alberque & Schreer
Why likely to join? |
Russian threat. Finland border, Sweden would break neutrality |
NET gain |
Big economies, good military (from being on their own) |
Cons |
NATO further threat now Finland border |
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Quick incorporation |
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US might assume big nordic economies to carry economic burden |
The State of NATO - Hooker
Russia possible |
Estonia, Latvia - ethnic minority |
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Kaliningrad |
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Black Sea |
Turkey problem |
Suppliewd drones to Ukraine, did not let Russian non-assidgned warships to Black Sea |
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No sanctions against Russia |
Other actors |
UK left EU, downsised army, France focus on EU and less NATO, Germany slow |
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Norway, Denmark stable |
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Southern Europe - Spain, Italy, more concerned with economies and refugees |
Sweden and Finland |
Increased defence by 50 and 70 percent |
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Germany alone with 2% GDP outspends Russia in defence |
What to spend on? |
Readiness is an issue, maintenance |
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UK, Germany, France - One combat division takes long time |
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Readiness issue, not burdensharing |
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Eastern border was poorly defended. "Tripwire" |
Pros |
Firm response to Ukraine |
Other initiatives |
More concrete readiness UK, France, Germany |
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Strong Eastern flank |
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Cyber aggression |
Brutal Examination (Russia) - Dalsjö
Putin |
More risk-taking now |
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Russia's conventional power is lacking |
Ukraine |
Russia expected Ukraine to give in (intelligence failure) |
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Centre of gravity (capital), but then no backup plan |
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No central commander in first 6 weeks, only regional commanders |
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Lack of allies - UK and US supplied a lot of information to Ukraine in the buildup, having public documents regarding NATO |
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Logistics problems - bad routes, lack of food |
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Failure of Russian Air superiority |
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Failure to coordinate ground and air |
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20% of tanks gone |
Russian preparation |
Ill-prepared soldiers |
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Restricted terrain, easily blocked |
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Got to test missiles during Syria, 60% fail apparently |
Why Russia fail to prepare? |
Wishful thinking of easy takeover |
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Too much confidence in lacking technology |
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Lapping over holes in Georgia 2008 |
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