Realism
Anarchy |
Rational and unitary actors |
Pursue power- Zero-sum |
Structural, defensive, offensive
Walts |
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Mearsheimer |
Self-help system |
Defending themselves |
Unsure intentions, assume the worst |
State intentions drive system |
Geography matters |
Security-dilemma |
Buckpassing |
Greedy states deterrence |
Balance (offset advantages) |
Balance |
Hegemony/ regional dominance |
Balance of power - expand or not |
Relative gains |
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Bandwagon territory |
Liberalism
Anarchy |
Rational acots |
NGOs, IGOs, economic unions, international regimes, etc |
Complex states= decisions reflect political system |
More than just military power matters (Japan, Germany example) |
States mutual dependence - moderate conflict |
Democratic peace theory |
Peace studies, human security, secutirisation
PRIO, SIPRI |
ICC, ICJ |
Ole Wæver |
ideological movement - Criticism of war studies |
Human security > State security |
Anything can become securitised |
No lasting peace without social, economic justice |
What about people who's state does not protect them? |
Example- energy |
Peace more than absence of shooting |
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If something a security issue, then dealt with differently |
Critical theory |
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Military security
Alliances |
Balance |
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Bandwagon |
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Protect weaker friendly states |
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Influencing states, putting internal pressure |
Nautrality |
Forced neutrality |
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Austria - old 1955 neutrality pact |
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Finnish neutrality - Soviet Threat |
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Sweden - neutrality as more freedom |
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Neutrality - legal status |
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Remain outside of military alliances in peace time |
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Neutral status accepted in war |
Deterrence |
Threatens a response that makes action very unappealing |
Arms control, cooperation |
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Only works if has capability of retaliation, convince that it would use, clearly communicates boundaries of acceptable |
Regime security
Regime security |
security challenges faced by regimes in the developing world, unable to provide full support for people living in their states |
Globalisation Challanges |
socio-economic underdevelopment, poverty, famine, violence, and scarce resources, can often result in intrastate war |
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often fail to establish a Monopoly over violence. |
Public Security |
Social contract - you let state intervene in your life, they have to pay back |
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Security is a social good |
Structural reasons for no security |
Unfavourable climate conditions, resource scarcity |
Deliberate conditions |
Authoritarian or corrupt regimes |
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Nepotistic governments |
Internal threats |
Alternative organisations/actors (muslim brotherhood) can first help, but then take over (warlords) |
Regime insecurity loop |
Because cant provide, chose coercive methods of control |
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Security dilemma |
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Coup-proofing |
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Deep states (states not ruled by government, but for example military) |
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Commissarism (secret police) |
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Accomodation (to elites) |
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Manipulation (putting a front, like Russia and "free elections") |
Societal, Economic and Environmental Security
Societal |
Collective Identity |
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Maintenance of ethnic and religious identities |
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Threats - repression of iden., lang., educ, cul., etc |
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Horizontal competition - change bc forced (SU and russian) |
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Vertical competition - pushed to narrower identities (Yugoslavia) |
Environmental |
Non-traditional |
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Environmental dangers |
Economic |
Sanctions - offensive |
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The politically motivated denial, or threat of denial, abnormal economic relations with the intent of changing behaviours. |
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Trade, finance, aid |
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Coercive Diplomacy
When? |
Full-scale war or CD |
Deterrence vs CD |
Deterrence - keep doing. CD - change behaviour |
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CD must leave a choice LIMITED FORCE no ground |
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Not the amount of force, but how it is communicated |
Schelling |
Coercive diplomacy - threats of limited force (sticks) + inducements (carrots) |
George and Simons' - most important |
Asymmetry of motivation - motivated enough to keep pressure |
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Sense of urgency |
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Opponent's fear of escalaton |
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Clarity on precise terms - specific demands (Russia Crimea bad) |
Jakobsen "Ideal Policy" |
Threat to defeat quickly with little costs |
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Deadline |
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Inducements (both sides must get something) |
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Assurance against future demands |
Success? |
Only if limited force and not escalation to brute force |
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Temporary, long term - negotiations likely |
Weapons of Mass Destruction
MAD |
Mutually assured destruction - not credible |
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Flexible response after 1967 |
Chemical weapons |
Banned |
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