Cheatography

Mobile Cheat Sheet

by rschacht via cheatography.com/23536/cs/11637/

Security Basics		Security Basics (cont)		power/energy		Recent Trends in Security	
Symmetric Key	One key is shared by two users both encryption & decryption (substitution cipher,	Most problemati c part in mobil apps?	Android abstraction layer	factors that affect power	power affects temp, but energy doesn't	ID vs Auth Data	Auth = username + pass, ID = passwd & something like biometric sending false radio signal to pace maker and inducing heart attack
				equations	power/area proportional to temp		
Assymetric	aes, des) Public and Private Key	Preventing replay attacks?	Use a nonce	associatio ns	higher current implies high power which increases cpu frequency	injection	
Substitution Ciper Diffie-	cipher 2^n/2 Exchanging secret keys over insecure medium. Known	Pros of Symmetric Keys	No worry of replay or man in the middle attacks	runaway decrea	power -> temp -> resistance decrease -> current increase I (cycle)	Threat Model/At tack model	What the system thinks about the model. Believes attacker is much more powerful than he actually is. Attack model attacker believes it knows a lot about the system
Exchange medi large base		Agreement on shared	diffie helman or KDC	energy	asffects battery life, power * time = E		
	large prime and base shared and a secret integer	key Certificate Auth	Binds pub key to part. entity. E registers with CA. When Alice wants bobs pub key, get the certificate, apply CA pub key and get bobs pub key.	energy harvesting	solar, wind -> high capacity, low leakage (low discharge), low capacity, high leakage		
DES	56-bit symmetric key, 64bit plain text US standard				(quick discharge), appliance	Key establish	Done using human body
AES	Replaces DES 128 bit			Certificate Authority Certification authorities • Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. • Ergisters its public key with CA. • Ergovides "proof of identity" to CA. • CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. • Carceates certificate for body of the corceation of the corc		ment in physi. sec.	
Axor0, AxorA	A, 0					Ways to fool machine	brute force feature guess, generate signal (generative), evasion, poison
Main Sec. Probs In Mobile?	Config. management, excessive privleges, privacy violations, poor	Symmetric and Public Key Problems	Sym: establish shared key? (deffie-helman, KDC), Public Key(Man in middle) use CA				
	session management		,	information 🔏			

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Recent Trends in Security		Recent Trends in Security (cont)		Internet of Things		Internet of Things (cont)	
(cont) Evasion attack	create points to gain access without getting	Agent security	Consumes less ip addresses than mobile host Increase in security strength -> hardening Hardening implies more	Challenges of CPS	hard to know how many sensors to use, what data to collect	Difference between gps and tower based location managem	gps needs clear line of sight and is more accurate. Tower based management is bad if you're not near tower, accessibility
Poison	caught, alter features attacker can see	ance tradeoff	difficult classification boundaries May increase False positives or negatives How to find a balance	Cyber Physical Systems	embedding sensors into physical devices		
attack	the training set, injects their own data at key points, skews the lines		between security strength and performance? Multi-objective optimization problem g Technique	Human to Human interaction	person a thinks about a color red and that dot is displayed to another person in	ent? what is iot	is less than gps. Network of Physical Objects embedded systems with electronics,
Biometric signals	Signals that don't change like fingerprints		RDENING TECHNIQUE	3 charactertis	another country anytime, anything, any place connetion		software, sensors enable objects to exchange data with manufacturer, operator, other devices through network infrastructure allow remote control direct integration computer + physical
Physiologi cal signals	hard because constantly	 Measures to Fitness cheo 	o improve security of ML algorithms ck	tics of IOT devices			
Hardening Technique	changing instead of line, have piecewise curves, or instead of line use	 Increase cc Convex po 	omplexity of classifiers	USN application layer	where apps are built to perform tasks using the sensors through middleware		
Internet Control	polygon(polytope) agent advertisement,			middleware (Drivers)	allows you to build apps on top of iot sensors		world Result: automation in all fields
Protocol Messages	agent solicitation, registration request, registration reply			sensor networking layer (bottom)	sensors are launched in environment and report to usn		

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Challenges	in Security	RSA Ex	ample	CUDA (cont)	
Challenges in medical apps	resource constraints in sensors, poor software dev support, real-time requirements for health apps		RSA example: Bo deals of eff to an eld of a set of the set of end of the set of the set end of the set of end of the set end of the set of the set of the set deals of the set of the set of the set the set of the set of the set of the set the set of the set of the set of the set the set of the set of the set of the set of the set the set of the set of t	global	As before,global is a CUDA C keyword meaning — add() will execute on the device — add() will be called from the host
Confidentiality: o "understand" m - sender encrypts - receiver decrypt Authentications each other Message integrity message not all detection Access and avail available to use	twork security? nly sender, intended receiver should essage contents message ender, receiver want to confirm identity of y: sender, receiver want to ensure tered (in transit, or afterwards) without ability: services must be accessible and rs	RSA: V Useful n <i>n = pq</i> , th	$x' \mod n = x' \mod (p-1)(q-1) \mod n$ $= m^{ed} \mod (p-1)(q-1) \mod n$ $(using number theory result above)$ $= m^{I} \mod n$ $(since we chose ed to be divisible by$ $(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1)$ $= m$	memory management	Host and device memory are distinct entities — Device pointers point to GPU memory May be passed to and from host code May not be dereferenced from host code — Host pointers point to CPU memory May be passed to and from device code May not be dereferenced from device code
Correy Isake Mean Correy Isake Mean Correy Dyscale Arcore Cyber and physical proce Operations in comp physical world & Arco Potentally.humar-in Heterogeneous emit magnitude difference	Image: Strain	secret inte a (g ^b mod p)	g ^a mod p g ^b mod p		
thread index Indexing Arr	king ays With Threads And Blocks	System	Model SYSTEM MODEL		
 To index array w Ilizialia blockfor.x = 0 If we have M three 	ple as just using threadIdx.x or blockIdx.x as indices tith 1 thread per entry (using & threadS/block) UserId(x, + 1) by the first of	25 =	Insors Insors Insors Insors Machine Learning System Algorithm Actuation		
		CUDA CUDA basics	Terminology Host – The CPU and its memory (host memory) Device – The GPU and its memory (device memory		

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